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Abstract 
 
 Holding Brazilian Mayors Accountable:  Evidence for Retrospective 
Voting in Brazilian Social Policy  
 
Ross Delbert Van Horn, MGPS, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Carolyn Heinrich 
 
Notwithstanding convincing evidence of electoral returns associated with Brazil’s non-
contributory cash transfer program (Bolsa Família) captured at the national level in 
presidential elections, little empirical work has reviewed if program expansion translated 
into electoral returns for mayors, the key administrators of the flagship program that 
benefits 1 in 4 Brazilians. The results from the statistical analysis presented here reveal 
that, on average, adding eligible beneficiary families (what the study calls program 
performance) positively impacted reelection probabilities at the municipal level for 
incumbents in 2008.   The political effect was mediated by the size of the program. That 
is, voters rewarded enrollment changes when a larger share of the total family population 
in a municipality participated in the program. Borrowing on theories of retrospective voting 
models developed in the United States, the paper explores conditions under which the 
scope of social programs engender retrospective electoral effects.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The central question advanced in this paper is whether a mayor’s record of program 
performance in administering a highly popular cash transfer program impacts their reelection odds. 
I expand on prior research that points to the program’s electoral effects of this highly popular 
program at the national level by using a municipal unit of analysis. In Brazil’s federation of 27 
states, municipal governments oversee many social programs that attempt to ameliorate poverty.  
The design of Bolsa Família, no different in this regard, relied heavily on the structure of federalist 
system to implement the program.   In 2004, mayors in Brazil’s 5,561 municipalities received a 
municipal target for the number of households that were considered eligible for participation in a 
cash transfers program, based on 1996 census data. The municipal governments, led by mayors, 
were then responsible for finding and enrolling households that were eligible for the program. 
Once enrolled in the program, transfers were directly sent to participants on an ATM debit card on 
a monthly basis by the federal government.    
The design of the program put mayors at the forefront of this highly popular program. As 
Serguei Soares a leading researcher on Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Brazil argues, the 
municipality is the lifeblood of the Bolsa Família program (Soares 2012: 12) In order for the 
federal government to reach its target of 11 million families, set in 2002, mayors were responsible 
for identifying and enrolling low income families eligible to participate in Bolsa Família based on 
targets set by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) (Fenwick 2009; 116).  
Statistical models used to examine if mayors benefited from sharing the “day-to-day” 
operations of the this highly popular social program when the number of beneficiaries reached the 
peak of its expansionary period in 2008 show that  net enrollment changes of families included in 
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the program by local government increased the likelihood that incumbent mayors were reelected.  
The implications of the local electoral effect in 2008, however, call for markedly different 
interpretations when juxtaposed with the widely cited effect of this program at the national level. 
Unlike former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva who was politically motivated to scale up the 
program in 2002 for his 2006 reelection bid, mayors participating in this process were simply 
meeting enrollment targets based on a neutral assessment of need from government officials in 
Brasília (Janvry et al. 2005, 2). In other words, Lula was rewarded for his efforts to expand the 
program, while the electoral effects explored in this report at the local level are inherently 
connected to program performance by local government.    
In this vein, the argument made for local electoral effects is framed within in an analysis 
of retrospective voting. In the broadest of terms, this brand of political science scholarship is 
devoted to understanding the relationship between votes and voter evaluations of  incumbent’s 
performance in office (Fiorina 1981; Downs 1957; Key 1966). And with good reason: democracy 
certainly benefits from regular elections, but stronger democracies benefit from elections where 
voters utilize a fleeting political moment to hold politicians accountable for their performance in 
office.   
In the first known analysis of retrospective voting in single-function elections for local 
office in the United States, Berry and Howell (2007) argue that the foremost challenges facing 
theories of retrospective voting fall around empirically demonstrating that a voter’s calculus is 
built on information from a relevant performance outcome, and that the outcome must be 
associated with the incumbent who oversees this program (847).  Because Mayors sit at the 
gateway to participation in the Bolsa Família program, municipal enrollment changes represent a 
robust, indicator of performance that is experienced by each enrolled (or excluded) family. Simply 
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establishing that the link between a political office and program responsibility has been conceived 
by the electorate, however, is not fully satisfactory for an analysis of retrospective voting. Even if 
citizens are aware of which elected officials are responsible for certain programmatic outcomes, 
they must first be concerned about such outcomes and, more importantly, have access to 
information that enables them to vote retrospectively.   Berry and Howell expressly devote the 
majority of their analysis of school board elections in South Carolina to information provision. In 
their own words, to the extent that there is retrospective voting at all, “it critically depends on the 
volume, tone, and sources of information that voters have about recent change in the relevant 
domains of public life” (845).   
Ultimately, the question of how program information is incorporated into voter evaluations 
is empirical (Berry and Howell 2007, 848).  The analysis in this paper demonstrates that Bolsa 
Família’s rapid growth rate and high levels of national enrollment changes create a political effect 
when the size of the program in a municipality is taken into account alongside with performance 
indicators.  For eligible families, information based on direct personal experience with access to 
the program vis-à-vis enrollment changes is a byproduct of a mayor’s enrollment performance (i.e. 
enrolling qualified families in the program). In municipalities where Bolsa Família is heavily 
represented, larger shares of voters are concerned about inclusion performance and therefore  more 
likely to weigh performance in this program along with other considerations when casting votes.  
An extension of the same statistical analysis in the subsequent electoral period, when 
enrollment rates slow, bolster the claim that experience based information with respect to 
enrollment contributes to retrospective voting in Bolsa Família.  From 2008 to 2012, mayors 
continued expanding the program to participants not yet enrolled after initial efforts to connect 
families to the program.    Because the number of new families entering the program was relatively 
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small in the second electoral cycle in the analysis, given the aggressive inclusion efforts between 
2004 and 2008, the relative change in enrollment was modest. Because fewer families had to 
register with local government and the benefits now came exclusively from Brasilia, the one-time 
benefit of being at the forefront of the program significantly diminished. In fact, it is not present 
in this period at all.  
To the author’s knowledge, this paper offers the first analysis of local electoral effects over 
the life of the program (2004-2012) for the entire country. The assessment addresses two extant 
gaps in the research on cash transfers in Brazil and retrospective voting.  With respect to the 
former, given Brazil’s high levels of decentralization and the key role municipalities play in this 
program, the story of electoral effects is incomplete if the political officials largely responsible for 
the program’s ability to reach the families in need are left out of the analysis.   Far from being a 
one-off clientelistic exchange, the results presented here indicate that the electoral effect observed 
in program expansion is a sign of support for good governance and lacks the political motivations 
that dominate conclusions drawn from research that has covered this program in presidential 
elections.   
At a more theoretical level, the findings offer an extension of local retrospective voting 
models developed in the United States by demonstrating that in the absence of reliable and regular 
program outcome reporting in traditional media outlets, under certain conditions, information from 
personal experience in a program is readily drawn on to evaluate local program performance.   
Information drawn from reputable media sources may very well be appropriate for analyses of 
retrospective voting in local elections in the United States. However, experienced based 
retrospective voting enables us to explore these issues in settings where access to program 
information is lacking or where it is sparsely covered, such as many places in the developing world.     
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If the sum of voter experiences with a particular program are large enough to reward or punish 
politicians’ performance surrounding a policy in a voting district, then information drawn from 
experience in a program holds promise of being an indicator for past performance in retrospective 
voting models.  
The paper is divided into seven sections. It begins with a brief description of the program 
along with a justification for extending the analysis of the program’s electoral effects to local 
elections. In the second and third sections, the general theory of local retrospective voting is 
introduced and discussed in the context of Bolsa Família, along with the data used in the study to 
analyze these questions. The fourth and fifth sections of the paper articulate hypothesis statements 
and model specifications and methods used to address the main research questions.  A discussion 
of results in the sixth section is presented before concluding.     
Bolsa Família at the National and Local Level 
 By 2009, more than twenty developing countries began adopting a new experiment in 
social policy known as Conditional Cash Transfers (hereafter CCTs).  CCTs are unique in that pre-
identified beneficiaries, based on per capita poverty thresholds, receive transfers conditioned on 
such behaviors as school attendance for children and pre-natal health clinic visits for pregnant 
women. Elevated optimism surrounding successful outcomes for program participants has 
produced a vast number of studies to better understand the dynamics of social policy’s new “magic 
bullet” that spread from Latin America to 150 million low income households around the world in 
less than 20 years (Adato and Hoddinott 2007, 42).  
Brazil’s Bolsa Família, the largest and most well-known CCT, has been at the center of 
this academic research since the program first appeared in 1995 as an experimental city-level cash 
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transfers initiative in Campinas, São Paulo and Brasilia. Although program requirements and 
values of the transfers have been adjusted as the program evolved, it focuses on two types of 
families (Hall 2009, 4): the first group includes families with self-reported monthly income per 
capita up to 140 reais ($62 USD). Families in this income category receive cash transfers that vary 
according to number of children and pregnant and nursing women per household. For children, 
families receive 32 reais per child for up to five children under the age of 15. The families receive 
an additional 15 reais for pregnant women in the household. The second group targeted in the 
program, classified as the “extreme poor,” receive the same variable benefits, but are also entitled 
to a 70 reais monthly transfer independent of the number of children present in the household.          
In return for cash assistance, families must adhere to two conditions. First, all school aged 
children (7-17) must attend school.  Attendance records, monitored by the municipality, must be 
above 85 percent. Children up to the age of 7 must be vaccinated and attend nutritional 
development check-ups throughout the year.  Pregnant women are also required to complete pre 
and post-natal visits and attend health and nutrition seminars (Fiszbein et al. 2009, 37). Compliance 
with conditions is monitored by health centers and schools who report records to Caixa, the 
government bank which authorizes a monthly electronic transfer to a debit card held by the female 
head of household.   
  Numerous impact assessments of Bolsa Família show the program’s impressive impacts 
on poverty and inequality. The program is considered to have significantly reduced high levels of 
inequality in Brazil. By some estimates, the program alone is responsible for 25-30 percent of the 
drop in Brazil’s Gini coefficient between 2004 and 2006 (Soares 2012, 20). In reducing poverty, 
the program has performed equally well.  For those families classified as living in extreme poverty, 
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Soares et al. (2011) show that monthly transfers from Bolsa Família reduced the incidence of 
extreme poverty by almost 25 percent.   
Following up on the  success  Bolsa Família has had in ameliorating poverty and  reducing 
inequality, scholars have turned to question the political dimensions of a social program that 
benefits one in four of all Brazilians. Social policy, as Hall notes in his review of Bolsa Família, 
is inherently political (Hall 2012, 7).  Given such drastic economic improvements for low-income 
Brazilians, and the speed with which this program took off, this body of research has focused on 
the potential electoral effects of Bolsa Família. That is, the extent to which Bolsa Família 
strengthens the political positions of incumbent politicians (Hall 2012, 31). 
 Prior research on Bolsa Família emphasized two observations. The consensus among most 
scholars is that the expansion of the program in 2006 was directly related to Lula’s reelection in 
2006.  Irrespective of methods used in different analyses, including standard regression, public 
opinion survey data, spatial statistical analysis, all studies indicate   a statistically significant 
relationship between  Bolsa Família and voting behavior (Soares 2012; Marques et al. 2009; 
Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Soares and Terron 2008).  Hunter and Power (2007), for example, argue 
that in addition to overcoming an onslaught of corruption scandals leading up to the election, and 
steering the economy towards high growth, Bolsa Família was  “arguably the single most plausible 
explanation” for Lula’s reelection in 2006 (20).  Precisely because the north and northeast regions 
of Brazil rank low on indicators of human development, relative to Brazil’s more developed 
southern regions, the success of the program in these regions, the authors  argue, helped Lula 
secure 65-80 of all valid votes for these states (4).  Beyond the northeast, the article reveals how 
closely linked voter preferences for Lula reflected the extent of program coverage. At the state 
level, their analysis reveals that the share of families covered by Bolsa Família was highly 
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correlated (.62) with all valid votes casted for Lula in 2006 (19).  Zucco (2011), taking a slightly 
different approach, reviews the impact of the electoral effect of Bolsa Família by examining the 
size of the program and expenditure levels of the transfers. With respect to program size,  he finds 
that as the scope of the program expands, or simply, as the percentage  of beneficiary families 
increases in a  municipality, the incumbent vote share increased by almost a fifth of a percentage 
point in 2006 (16). 
  All studies share an exclusive focus on the impact that scaling up the program had in Lula’s 
presidential bid in 2006.1 Under Lula’s initiative, the program rapidly added 7 million households 
between 2002 and 2006. The magnitude of expansion and speed with which Lula scaled up the 
number of beneficiaries is indeed impressive. The graph in Figure 1 (See appendix Figure 1) shows 
the exponential degree of program expansion achieved in less than three years.    
 For Lula, the move to integrate all sub-national programs into one national program had 
several strategic advantages. Coming into office, Lula made three campaign promises, that 
according to public opinion polls, voters felt strongly he would accomplish in his four year term. 
They included alleviating poverty, hunger and misery; promoting job growth; and, raising the 
minimum wage (Fenwick 2009, 106).  Shortcomings in social programs, such as Fome Zero  (Zero 
Hunger), in Lula’s first two years in office elevated the stakes for his administration to find a cost 
effective strategy  to gain traction on the country’s pressing social challenges before elections were 
held again in 2006 (Hunter & Power 2007, 19).   Accomplishing this would not be easy.  High 
levels of party fragmentation and decentralization, two characteristics of Brazil’s democracy, make 
it hard for presidents to form coalitions and govern according to their policy preferences (Fenwick 
2009, 107; See Ames 2008). 
                                                 
 
1 Zucco (2011) also reviews the electoral effect at the national level in 2002 and 2010.   
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By integrating all sub-national programs into Bolsa Família, and relying on the 
constitutional authority of municipalities to administer poverty and social assistance programs, the 
Lula administration was able to successfully eliminate interference from state governments and 
bypass a complex landscape of executive-legislative relations that have traditionally hinder the 
policy process in Brazil (Fenwick 2009, 35).   
At the same time consolidation helped the Lula administration achieve its ambitious social 
policy objectives, federal-local collaboration empowered local governments. The change was 
experienced in two distinct ways. First, consolidation of all cash transfers under Bolsa Família 
leveled the financial playing field for municipal governments. Until 2003, CCTs were largely 
financed by state funds, when states could afford to do so. In the wake of the high inflationary 
period of the mid 1990s, high levels of sub-national debt put severe constraints on the ability to 
finance such programs. (Fenwick 2009: 112). 
 Next, and most important for this analysis, the design of the program put mayors at the 
forefront of this highly popular program. As Serguei Soares  one of the program’s a leading 
researcher on CCTs in Brazil argues, the municipality is the lifeblood of the Bolsa program (Soares 
2012, 12) For the expansion presented in the graph in Figure 1 (see appendix Figure 1) to have 
taken place, municipal agents of Bolsa Família, led by mayors, were identifying and enrolling low 
income families eligible to participate in Bolsa Família based on targets set by the Ministry of 
Social Development (MDS). Municipalities quickly responded to the opportunity to participate in 
the new national program and by 2006 all of Brazil’s 5,564 municipalities became full participants 
in the program (Fenwick 2009, 116). 
Various administrative decisions made by municipal governments, however, can result in 
different performance outcomes. Examples include  the way in which registration into the Cadastro 
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Único (Brazil’s social registry) is carried out (e.g., the location, scheduling of interviews; selection 
and training of interviewers and supervisors; use of technology, etc.); the reliability of information 
collected in the monitoring of conditionalities; the existence and functioning of social controls 
councils (SCCs) which are support organizations used during the enrollment phase; and (4) the use 
of complementary programs outside of Bolsa Família to assist families receiving the transfers 
(Lindert et al. 2007, 30).  Reflecting on implementation and the tremendous range in administrative 
capacities and decisions that affect enrollment efforts, Lindert et al. (2007) conclude:   
With these sources of heterogeneity – combined with differing administrative and 
financial capabilities as well as variance in political will and commitment to the 
program across municipalities – there will always be a spectrum for the quality of 
implementation, ranging from high to low performers (30). 
 
This paper examines such differences by considering if votes fall in line with better 
performance in enrollment. To what extent did mayors benefit politically from sharing “day-to-
day” operations of this highly popular social program when the number of beneficiaries reached 
the peak of its expansionary period in 2008 and again when expansion rates attenuated as the 
program reached saturation in 2012? The questions are explored through an analysis of municipal 
election outcomes and program performance in statistical models introduced in the next sections.  
Before proceeding to empirical tests, the paper reviews how performance based information is 
theoretically accounted for in the models by returning to core components of the retrospective 
voting framework introduced above.  
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Local Elections and Retrospective Voting 
 Berry and Howell (2007) offer convincing empirical evidence of how information on 
district level pupil achievement is processed in voter evaluations of incumbent school board 
members in school board elections in South Carolina in 2000. In particular, they show that when 
local newspapers devote significant coverage to learning trends, a positive relationship between 
student learning and incumbent’s reelections chances presents itself. On the other hand when 
media coverage declines, the empirical evidence for retrospective voting is absent. The strength of 
their work lies in their ability to focus on incumbent performance in single function elections (i.e. 
a position responsible for a single public process or program), thereby weeding out competing 
voter motivations such as party politics or likeability. They are also able to review information 
from media outlets, such as local newspapers, that relayed performance outcomes on school board 
members to the public.   
In Brazil, and in most countries, mayors do not meet the single function criterion that 
facilitates the ease of analyzing single-function political offices and elections. Nevertheless, 
municipalities in Brazil enjoy high degrees of fiscal and executive policy autonomy, making 
mayors influential actors in politics in Brazil’s federation of 26 states. Part of their executive 
autonomy comes from constitutional powers vested in local government through laws such as the 
Organic Law of Social Assistance (LOAS No. 8.742, December 1993)2 which attributes the 
execution of all programs confronting poverty to municipal governments.  While mayors oversee 
a good deal of other municipal projects including basic education, and small to medium sized 
infrastructure projects, social programs are  a policy area that they have  devoted significant 
administrative efforts towards since Brazil returned to democracy in 1985.   
                                                 
2 In Portuguese: Lei Organica da Assistencia Social 
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With respect to responsibility in the Bolsa Família program, it is clear that enrollment is 
the Mayors’ most visible and important task. Although funding for Bolsa Família comes from 
Brasilia, municipal governments, led by mayors, control the registration of potential beneficiaries 
onto the central database from which automated monthly payments are made.  Although 
performance outcomes related to enrollment and implementation cannot completely rule out other 
competing factors in an election that sway votes, it offers a strong empirical link for an assessment 
of retrospective voting in political offices that complicate the single function approach by looking 
at responsibility in one program that is readily identified by the public. For other factors that 
compete with performance based voting, standard control variables are introduced.  
Some scholars contend that an analysis of mayoral performance in Bolsa Família should 
extend beyond enrollment. Janvry et al. (2007) adopted this approach in their work on electoral 
incentives for Bola Escola, the cash transfer program focused on reducing school dropout rates 
that preceded Bolsa Família. Despite a sophisticated econometric analysis, the authors are unable 
to justify why the appropriate explanatory variable to assess performance in a cash transfer 
program should be school dropout rates in their analysis of program performance and retrospective 
voting in 261 municipalities in the northeast of Brazil.  The reporting cycle for adherence to the 
attendance requirements for participants begins with teachers sending monthly attendance records 
to the secretary of education, and ends with local governments enforcing penalties such as 
suspensions for conditionality transgressions, which in reality is very rare (Lindert et al. 2007; 55).  
In Bolsa Escola, teachers, the ministry of education, and Caixa, the national bank that administers 
the automated payments to participants, work in conjunction with mayors to administer this 
component of the program.   It is clear  that mayors are fairly far removed from the direct 
responsibility of the educational component of the Bolsa Escola, which was later incorporated into 
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Bolsa Família.  Not only is it harder to untangle administrative responsibility of school enrollment 
for this program, it could be that the cash incentive is having its intended effect.  In other words, 
Mayors are facilitators of increased school enrollment, but not ultimately responsible for intra-
household decision making that has been altered as a result of an influx of monthly cash incentives.    
At an even more basic level, Javry et al. (2007) make questionable assumptions about the 
electorates’ interest in public education outcomes related to Bolsa Família.  It makes intuitive sense 
that voters would care about dropout rates. Research by Bursztyn (2011) on revealed preferences 
of redistributive spending in Brazilian municipalities through survey experiments, however, 
indicates that between cash transfers and spending in public education, low income voters in 
Brazilian municipalities presented with experimental information shocks prefer policies that 
provide immediate assistance over increased spending on public education.  While this does not 
affirm that voters don’t care about school dropout rates, since it is a separate issue altogether, it 
shows that beyond participation, votes don’t conform to the program’s desired outcomes such as 
human capital gains addressed through attendance requirements.    
The models utilized here begin the simple assumption that families who are qualified for 
the program prefer to receive assistance.  With this fundamental interest in the program among 
voters, I then extend performance evaluations to incumbent mayors who have the legal mandate 
to enroll qualified families to receive assistance.    
After establishing a link between program responsibilities and the correct political office, 
it is necessary to understand how performance information from this link is obtained, when it 
becomes salient, and , identify how performance information is placed on the causal pathway of 
voter evaluation.  Berry and Howell (2007) stress that mediated information, rather than 
extrapolations from personal experiences, what is referred to in the literature as unmediated 
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information, is better suited to demonstrate the causal processes of retrospective voting in local 
elections.  The authors do, however, cite the potential weaknesses of mediated information sources 
such as newsprint, and local media. Above all, it cannot be assumed that all voters have access to 
mediated information covering outcomes (848).  As a complement to formal mediated information 
used in retrospective voting, the authors postulate that unmediated information can substitute 
information gaps where formal mediated performance outcomes are not present (848).  
 Brazil, compared to other countries with comparable per capita income levels, has the 
lowest levels of newspaper penetration in the world (Ferraz and Finan 2007, 709).  For example, 
newspaper coverage only reach about 42 copies per 1000 habitants.  Instead, local radio has 
become the central source of information on local politics in Brazil since the mid-1980s. Although 
radio offers an important link between politics and the electorate in the absence of newspapers, 
whether or not it functions as a disinterested medium between society and politics has been called 
into questioned by Boas and Hidalgo (2011). The authors contend that since the federal 
government added community radio to its regulatory responsibility in 1998, local political bosses 
who have acquired licenses for community radio shows by the ministry of communication in non-
competitive processes, benefit electorally from favorable coverage of  what may be the only source 
of information reporting on local politics (870). 
Given the dearth of newsprint sources, as well as the high potential for political control of 
local radio stations in Brazil, the most reliable source of information on Bolsa Família’s 
performance , then, is based on direct experience with the program.  Berry and Howell (2007) 
warn against an unmediated approach namely because of the possibly that voters using personal 
experience can err in trying to assess political performance for the municipality as a whole. That 
is, if a poor family is wrongfully excluded from the program, their negative evaluation of 
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performance may not fit with the mayor’s better than average enrollment efforts overall in a given 
municipality. To get around this, the paper looks at program performance with respect to program 
size.  If poor performance is punished where the program affects larger numbers of families, then 
experiences match performance reality. In other words, voters are correctly voting against 
underperformance in a program that has meaningful negative consequences in their voting district.  
 
Election & Program Performance Data   
The dependent variable (election outcomes) as well as several independent variables such 
as percent vote share, campaign expenses, party affiliation, age, education and marital status of 
each candidate are drawn from data reported by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) covering local 
elections in Brazil in 2000, 2004 and 2008 2012.3  Independent variables covering municipal 
characteristics were acquired through the Ministry of Social Development’s (MDS) portal for 
Management and Evaluation of Information (SAGI).4  Information on GDP and GDP per capita, 
federal transfers, population characteristics are all reported at the municipal level by year. A 
summary table of descriptive statistics, including municipal controls not mentioned here, is found 
in the appendix (see Table 1.2). 
Key explanatory variables used to estimate program performance were taken from 
summary statistics of Brazil’s yearly household survey (PNAD) reported on the SAGI portal 
online. Municipal coverage for the program is derived from base line estimates for municipal 
program eligibility set by MDS using census data compared to all participating families.  
                                                 
3 Information taken on elections in 2000 is needed to track mayors eligible for reelection in 2008. Because the 
analysis centers on incumbents, I exclude mayors constrained by the two term constitutional limit in 2008 (those 
who won in 2000) from the analysis. 
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Following Zucco (2011) in his article on the national electoral effect for Bolsa Família, to measure 
program size I added the number of beneficiary families for each municipality and divided this 
number by the total number of families in that municipality. Although an imperfect measure of 
size, this variable is a good proxy  of the potential political salience a program can have when it is 
weighted by the number of its beneficiaries. 
 
Hypothesis Statements  
Responding to the widely reported positive electoral effect of Bolsa Família in 2006, the 
primary hypothesis of this paper is that higher relative enrollment changes, driven by local 
government, are expected to increase the reelection odds of incumbent mayors who administered 
Bolsa Família between 2004 and 2008. I expect the electoral effect to be further conditioned by 
the size of the program in the municipality. That is, program expansion is politically powerful 
when the municipality has a larger proportion of Bolsa Família beneficiaries.  This condition is 
accounted for through the use of an interaction term between program size and the relative 
expansion of the program in four years.    
 
Hypothesis 1: As the relative change in enrollment between 2004 and 2008 increases at the 
municipal level, the probability that incumbent mayors are reelected in 2008 is expected to 
increase when the share of families participating in the program is large relative to the total family 
population. 
 
In 2012, when enrollment slows after most eligible families have joined the program, 
information that connects voters to mayoral performance is present for fewer families among the 
electorate. That is, experience in program performance is reduced to few families not yet enrolled 
making performance in this program less salient for mayoral elections as the program  
has matured.    As such, I expect no political payoff for enrollment changes.   
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Hypothesis 2:  The relative change in enrollment between 2008 and 2012 will have no effect on 
the probability that incumbent mayors are reelected in 2012.   
Enrollment captures one dimension of Bolsa Família’s electoral effect. In addition to 
looking at new recipients vis-à-vis enrollment indicators, I also examine how the enforcement of 
program conditions affected reelection odds. In each assessment period, families that do not meet 
the conditional requirements for the program are identified. The failure of meeting education 
conditions arise when attendance for children of participating families falls below 85 percent. 
Families are reported as failing to meet the health conditions set out in the program when children 
less than 7 years old fail to provide up to date vaccine booster reports or when pregnant women do 
not attend pre-natal visits in local health clinics. 
 In theory, benefits are withheld until local social workers approve a family’s re-admittance 
into the program. Some argue that the enforcement of program conditions is soft because most 
mayors are reluctant  to punish non-compliance (Javry et. al 2005: 05). For those mayors who do 
more vigorously apply program conditions, this paper examines whether enforcement of program 
conditions is rewarded when they stand for re-election. If “good governance” is really driving the 
electoral effect of cash transfers, then the number of program suspensions should also increase 
election odds. In other words, good governance should be rewarded for two administrative 
components of the program: implementation and regulation.  
 
Hypothesis 3:  The enforcement of program conditions, a proxy for engagement and administrative 
competency in the Bolsa Família program, should increase reelection odds for incumbent mayors 
in both periods.  
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Model Specification and Methods 
 
         The dependent variable is limited to two outcomes of an election where Y=1 for a reelection 
and Y=0 for a loss at the polls. The model in equation 1.1, estimated with a logistic regression by 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), takes the following form: 
 
(1.1) 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑧 ∗ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑋𝑖
′ +  𝑢𝑖    
 
Where the left hand side of the equation is the probability of reelection, Y= 1, in 2008 and 
2012. The probability of winning is expressed as function of four policy variables W, Z, T, Z*T 
and X, a matrix of covariates relating to each candidate as well as municipal characteristics 
previously discussed in the section above. Where W is a dummy variable for the number of benefit 
cancellations/suspensions for school and health condition violations, Z is the relative expansion of 
enrollment over four years, T captures the size of the program, and T*Z is the interaction effect 
that measures the impact of enrollment expansion when the size of the program is taken into 
account. 
Data limitations that arise from incumbents elected in 2004 that opted out of a reelection 
bid in 2008 (N=1153), and candidates elected in 2008 that did not stand for reelection in 2012 
(N=1,035), make estimations of equation 1.1 on only those incumbents who opted to stand for re-
election in 2008 (N=2801) and 2012 (N=2,112) prone to a sample selection bias. In this case, 
because the missing data falls on our outcome variable, the decision not to rerun potentially poses 
a sample selection bias that might influence the true significance and or magnitude of the policy 
variables with respect to reelection odds.  There may be underlying characteristics, or patterns, 
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among incumbent non-candidates (herein retirees) that force performance coefficients to over or 
underestimate election outcomes when they are removed from an equation that is making 
statements about the entire population of mayors.    
To account for a potential selection effect, equation 1.1 is estimated on two different 
dependent variable structures in order to determine the extreme upper and lower bounds for the 
explanatory variables’ impacts on reelection odds.    
  
Dependent Variable Structure 1: 
  𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑍 ∗ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑋𝑖
′ + 𝑢𝑖 
𝑌𝑖  = {
1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
0         𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠/𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠 
 
 
Dependent Variable Structure 2: 
 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑊𝑖 = 1) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖 +  𝛾2𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑍 ∗ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑋𝑖
′ +  𝑢𝑖    
𝑊𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑛
0 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒
     And   𝑌𝑖  = {
 1   𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
0     𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠
 
 
Structure 1 combines all early retiree incumbents into the 𝑌𝑖 = 0 outcome along with 
incumbent mayors that ran and actually lost. Therefore, the logistic regression is estimated for all 
mayors in 2008 that did not face term limits (N=3,755) and (N=3,147) in 2012, including mayors 
who didn’t run. Under this condition, the model assumes that regardless of performance on Bolsa 
Família, the mayor that chose early retirement would have lost the election had she entered the 
race in 2008 or 2012.  This procedure forces the estimates of policy variables to be on the 
extreme lower end of the true effect on election outcomes in both periods.  This procedure allows 
the retired incumbent outcomes to be included in the model without biasing the estimates of 
30 
 
 30 
Bolsa Família policy variables upwards.  The key advantage of estimating the model (equation 
1.1) on this dependent variable structure is that if the policy variables indicate the right sign and 
achieve statistical significance, then the conditional hypothesis is correct and potentially 
underestimated with a set of very strict assumptions.  
Whereas the estimation with Dependent Variable Structure 1 automatically penalizes every 
non-incumbent by assigning them to the 0 outcome to fully account for any selection effect, 
Dependent Variable Structure 2 allows the selection effect to be present by excluding outcomes 
from retirees in the model.  The procedure with the second structure relaxes all assumptions (i.e. 
it ignores the effect of selection if present) and produces the extreme upper bounds for the policy 
coefficients on election outcomes. Thinking visually about the true effect of policy variables on a 
continuum, Figure 1.1 identifies the two estimation techniques and the extreme upper and lower 
bounds of our coefficient estimates.  In addition to the technique explored here, the appendix offers 
a second method wherein a Heckman selection procedure is used to correct for the potential 
selection bias in early incumbent retirement (see appendix: Heckman Procedure).  
 
Figure 1.1: Range of Policy Coefficient Magnitude  
Structure 1                                                                                                          Structure2 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
Conservative Underestimates                                |    --------------- X---------------     |                                            Potentially Biased Over Estimates 
0/1 (early retirement inclusion)                                                  true effect                                                                 0/1 (early retirement exclusion)  
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Discussion of Results  
The results reported in the appendix in Table 1.3  that compare the electoral effect under 
two different data structures discussed above, largely mirror Bolsa Família’s electoral effect 
widely reported at the national level in the 2006 presidential elections. The policy variable 
estimates confirm that in 2008, mayors who expanded the program during their four year term in 
office were rewarded at the polls when the number of family beneficiaries represented a large 
portion of the total municipal family population. This is shown with respect to the interaction term 
Program Size and Program Enrollment Change. The conservative lower bound coefficients show 
that expansion efforts increased reelection odds by 12% in Model 1. In Model 2, where the 
selection bias is not treated, the odds of reelection climb to 15%.  For Model 3, when the most 
recent electoral cycle in 2012 is examined, policy variables, as hypothesized, lose their 
significance. With some certainty, the results indicate that under certain conditions, a mayor’s 
effort to expand enrollments has positive electoral effects. In addition to enrollment indicators, the 
results also indicate that electoral rewards were significant and positive when mayors enforced the 
program’s conditions.   
Working under the assumption that selection is present but not strongly influencing our 
variables of interest, the rest of the analysis focuses on interpreting logit results from Table 1.3.  
The empirical contribution from the models and interpretation of these results with support from 
survey data are explored in turn.   
Turning to the variables of interest, it is worth noting that across all models, increased 
enrollment alone is found to reduce reelection probabilities for all three estimations in Table 1.3. 
This seemingly contradictory result, in fact, gives strength to the decision to interact this variable 
with program size. To put it simply, program expansion was hypothesized to have an impact given 
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that the program was large, relative to the size of the municipality. If expansion reached 120 
percent during a mayor’s tenure, but the absolute expansion only meant that beneficiary families 
jumped from 10 to 22, one would not expect much of an electoral effect in a municipality of 3,000. 
In this instance, the magnitude of non-participation would drown out the electoral effect for 
enrollment performance.  
To gauge the impact of unit changes in this variable, Table 1.4 found in the appendix (see 
appendix Table 1.4: Reelection Probabilities and Enrollment Changes for Top enrollment and No 
enrollment 2004-2008)   shows the predicted probabilities of reelection for mayors in the top 5 
percent of enrollment performance compared to mayors who did not expand the program at all 
during their four year term. The comparison is done by holding the size of the program at quintiles 
of family representation in a municipality constant.  For mayors who failed to expand the program 
(i.e. no net enrollment change between 2004-2008) when the number of families participating in 
the program is large relative to all families in the municipality (80 to 100 percent), mayors are 4 
percent less likely to win a reelection compared to mayors who fail to enroll families when the 
program has a smaller presence in a municipality (20 to 40 percent).  
Turning to mayors in the top 5 percent of program enrollment (i.e. a 300 percent enrollment 
change), the inverse occurs: mayors who are able to extend the program to more families in 
municipalities where the program is large relative to the total family population (80 to 100 percent) 
have slightly higher predicted probabilities compared to mayors who achieve equally large 
enrollment changes in municipalities where program participation is low. On balance, the policy 
coefficients were fairly small and outsized by explanatory variables such as vote capture coming 
from the prior election.  Given the myriad of competing factors that explain election outcomes, 
this is an impressive result.   
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Expectations that strong program enforcement would yield electoral benefits were strongly 
met. Program suspension, cancellations and warnings for the final reporting period before the 2008 
election strongly increased the probability that a mayor would be reelected. Point estimates reveal 
that in each increasing quartile of repercussions reported, mayors have higher odds of winning. 
Mayors falling in the top quartile of repercussion enforcement, for example, were 86 percent more 
likely to be reelected.  If the positive coefficients for program enrollment efforts interacted with 
program size measure one end of the electoral effect, the positive impact of enforcement measures 
demonstrate that citizens rewarded mayors who were actively engaged with the program.  
 Insights drawn from this effect should be balanced by the likelihood that enforcement 
variables are most likely related to levels of local government engagement and proficiency. 
Meaning, high enforcement is likely a sign that the government is active in other areas of public 
life that voters are aware of and responding to. In addition, it is unclear how reliable information 
coming from this variable is given that reporting across municipalities is not uniform. While 
municipalities reporting the least number of enforcement actions in the September 2008 reporting 
period ranged from 0 to 4, the upper quartile reported between 60-800 repercussions. Nevertheless, 
these results indicate that the electoral effect is multidimensional. Where mayors do report, the 
effect was not only about connecting qualified citizens, but politicians benefited from having an 
active presence in administering the more sensitive components of the program.  Despite meeting 
expectations for hypothesized impact in 2008, in 2012, program enforcement lose significance in 
the models in table 1.3. Unlike enrollment, this aspect of program administration continues to be 
important as it applies to all families each year. The novelty of the program could have explained 
voter attention to enforcement in the first period that wears off after the program and adherence to 
program conditions becomes routinized.     
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Survey data analyzed by Zucco (2011) with program participants and non-participants in 
Bolsa Família in 2006 lends further support to the results reported above.   Zucco examines voting 
behavior between recipients and non-recipients of Bolas Família in the 2006 presidential election.  
He finds that among the program’s poorest voters, the probability of voting for Lula increased by 
32 percent as function of participation in the program. The probability is slightly less, but still 
highly significant, for families living just below the program threshold for participation. While the 
assumption that participants vote for more favorably for incumbents overseeing the program is 
built into models above, the survey data gives concrete evidence that participation is tied to the 
vote.     
 The survey data also sheds light on an interesting dynamic that could be explaining how 
program size moderates the salience of program performance by considering non-participants. To 
test the effect of a potential redistribution backlash by non-beneficiaries, Zucco used the same 
survey data to match non-beneficiaries who knew at least one beneficiary to non-beneficiaries who 
did not know a program participant on a set of socio-demographic indicators. The analysis revealed 
that non-beneficiaries who knew a program participant were 18 percent more likely to vote for 
Lula in 2006 (15).  In the same study he also examines the backlash effect by matching non-
beneficiaries where Bolsa Família had high rates of participation, with their non-beneficiary 
counter parts in municipalities where program participation was low. The results show that higher 
program coverage at the municipal level increased the probability of the non-beneficiary vote for 
Lula by 30 percent (Zucco 2011; 24).  In addition to participants who benefited economically 
supporting program performance, Zucco concludes that the electoral support is driven, in part, by 
a “solidarity effect” between non-beneficiaries and participants that leads non-recipients to factor 
program performance into voting.  While municipal level survey data on mayoral elections would 
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be needed to adopt the solidarity argument wholesale, it is clear that program size is important but 
instead of being tied solely to participant evaluations of performance, a community level 
awareness of performance outcomes might also explain retrospective voting in municipalities 
where participation is high.    
   
Conclusion 
This paper has examined an important gap in the political analysis of one of the most 
popular innovations in social policy in the developing world. In the context of Brazil’s Bolsa 
Família, several scholars have reviewed the political dimensions of this program. Their analyses 
have been restricted to the one-time electoral effect that expanding the program had for President 
Lula in 2006.  Taking into account Brazil’s highly decentralized federalist government, this paper  
considers how incumbent mayors faired in reelections as a result of their integral role in enrolling 
residents and administering this program. From my analysis, two conclusions emerge.  
The primary question asked in this paper is whether enrollment expansion improves 
reelection odds for incumbents. The results from the statistical analysis reveal that, on average, 
adding eligible beneficiary families positively impacted reelection probabilities at the municipal 
level for incumbents in 2008.  Further, this political effect was mediated by the size of the program 
in the municipality. When the program has low coverage, the salience of program performance is 
most likely replaced by other factors motivating voters. Marginal predictions show that the top 
performers have a slight electoral advantage when enrollment changes take place in high 
representation municipalities. In those same municipalities, if enrollment does not change at all, 
mayors are slightly disadvantaged compared to underperforming mayors where program 
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participation is low.  To put it concretely, the political payoff was present where the policy was 
most visible and deeply felt by voters  
As enrollment begins to taper off, contact with municipal governments for this program is 
significantly reduced in the 2008 and 2012 period. As expected, in the declining enrollment phase, 
performance on enrollment indicators is not significant. In the 2012 election, variables that helped 
explain reelection outcomes in 2008, such as the share of all valid votes in the previous election 
had a positive, and statistically significant, impact on reelection odds In the 2012 election, Bolsa 
Família loses part of its novelty, and traditional determinants of reelections such as vote share and 
municipal characteristics surface as the main predictors of reelection for incumbents.     
Lastly, in addition to enrollment indicators, including additional variables related to 
condition enforcement revealed that the electoral effect was also determined by how active mayors 
were in the program in 2008. The paper demonstrated that in addition to enrolling families, mayors 
that enforced program conditions at higher levels were rewarded at the ballot box. Limitations to 
this interpretation are related to the fact that governments achieving high enforcement were also 
likely engaged in other areas of municipal governance that was also evaluated by citizens during 
the election. The reliability of this measure is also challenged by a reporting structure that varies 
highly across municipalities. Despite the 2008 results for this variable corresponding to my 
hypothesis, the non-significance of enrollment indicators in 2012 is puzzling. It indicates, to some 
degree, that citizens are less concerned with a mayor’s engagement with the program as the 
program matures.  Future research would benefit from tackling this area of work. However,  taken 
collectively with the results from non-significance in enrollment changes in 2012, it is hard to 
imagine that mayors will continue to benefit from this program electorally given the initial hype, 
and their role in the program, has passed.    
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Notwithstanding convincing evidence for a local electoral effect, several outstanding 
questions remain for future research. To begin, omitted variables are most likely present. At the 
outset of this paper I argued that the first methodological task was to correctly model the 
determinants of reelection.  The model is potentially strong and correctly specified for incumbents, 
, but it does not address how challengers influenced election results. For example, mayors who are 
incumbents in 2008 could face mayors who served from 2000-2004, were defeated by a close 
margin in 2004, but ran again in 2008. Without challenger characteristics  specified in the model, 
a large portion of the election outcome is left out of the analysis. Although the number of 
candidates was used to control for electoral competition resulting from challengers running in an 
election, more variables are needed to fully specify this relationship. 
Related omitted variable bias arises from limiting the analysis to Bolsa Família. A more 
robust analysis of social policy  and retrospective voting would include the  thirty social programs 
(including other cash transfer programs)  that contributed to improving the quality of life for 
Brazil’s marginalized citizens in the time period used for this study  (Hall 2012: 8). Without 
including the contribution of performance in all social programs, which are assumed to carry their 
own political weight, the electoral effect of Bolsa Família is not fully determined.  
With respect to the policy reviewed in this paper, the ability to draw conclusions from this 
analysis to make broader statements about good governance in other social policy arenas is limited 
due to the unique characteristics of Bolsa Família.  The results, however, offer promise that citizens 
in this period, held local politicians accountable for a social program that penetrates what Howell 
and Barry refer to as the relevant arenas of public life (Howell and Barry 2012: 3).   This is 
welcome news for a country that delegates such high degrees of political autonomy and policy 
making influence to its municipal governments.    
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Appendix  
Figure 1: Bolsa Família Expansion 2004-2012 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics  
Covariate Summary 
Statistics    N Mean 
Std 
Dev. 
Municipal Variables     
Area   2801 1447.15 4678.24 
Density   2801 114.05 575.94 
Population (Categorical)  Frequency    
1,000-5,000 25% -- -- -- 
6,000-10,000 24% -- -- -- 
11,000-250,000 25% -- -- -- 
GDP pc 08  2676 8776.89 5756.45 
Change GDP pc 04-08  2663 0.74 8.43 
Mayor Level Characteristics 
    
Vote Share 2004  2799 0.5301 0.11 
Reais per vote  2637 67.72 130.07 
Federal Transfers 2004-2008 (log)  2801 17.28 0.78 
Education Electorate      
Primary or less  2637 0.429 0.036 
High School and Above   2637 0.299 0.032 
Mayor's  Education Frequency    
read and write 1.52% -- -- -- 
primary incomplete  10.76% -- -- -- 
Primary Complete 6.81% -- -- -- 
Secondary Incomplete  4.64% -- -- -- 
Secondary Complete  26.85% -- -- -- 
College Incomplete 6.73% -- -- -- 
College Complete  42.68% -- -- -- 
Number of Candidates Frequency    
1 34% -- -- -- 
2-3 33% -- -- -- 
4-6 33% -- -- -- 
  2800 50.49 9.33 
Marital Status Frequency    
Married  81% -- -- -- 
Widow 11% -- -- -- 
Separated  1.29% -- -- -- 
Divorced 3.33% -- -- -- 
Bolsa Variables      
Repercussions(categorical)  Frequency    
1-2 25% -- -- -- 
2-3 25.88% -- -- -- 
3 or more 24.99% -- -- -- 
Program Size  2717 0.57 0.16 
Enrollment change   2790 1.18 5.01 
Enrollment change * Program Size   2706 0.409 2.15 
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Table 1.3: Main Results  
 
   
Lower     
Bounds2008 
Upper Bounds 
2008 
Upper Bounds 
2012  
   [1]  [2]   [3]   
Independent Variables        
Municipal Level Characteristics         
Area   .999*** .999** 1.000 
Density   .999+ 0.999 1.000 
Population (11,00-250,000 )  .773+ .701** .985(.117) 
       
Mayor level Characteristics     
Vote Share 2004  1.81+ 6.85*** 1.03*** 
Reais per vote  1.08 1.06  -  
Federal Transfers (log)  1.13 1.06  1.01  
Education (Electorate) (Primary=>) .422 8.09  1.05  
  (HS=>) .962 8.41  1.07  
     
Number Candidates  (2 or 3) .419*** .040*** .500** 
  (3 or more) .274*** .024*** .031*** 
        
Age   .937*** .964*** .97*** 
Marital status 
 
1.41** 1.47***  .888  Married 
  Widow .501+ 1.01  1.18   
  Separated 2.12*** 2.10 ***  .646   
  Divorced 1.22   1.27  .832   
Bolsa Familia Policy Variables      
 Repercussions (1-2) 1.30***  1.289* 1.09 
  (2-3) 1.60***  1.54*** .885 
  (3 or more) 1.70***   1.88***  .934  
Program Size  .342  .787  1.25  
Enrollment Change   .954+  .942*  .842  
Program Size*Enrollment Change  1.12*   1.15*   1.03   
 [1] 
  N=3755 
[2] 
 N=2686 
  [3] 
N=2111  
pseudo R2=.09 pseudo R2=.06 pseudo R2=.03 
Wald Chi2 (298)(p=.000) Wald Chi2(158) (p=.000) Wald Chi2(95) (p=.000) 
   
Notes: *p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001; + p ≤ .10 
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Table 1.4: Reelection Probabilities and Enrollment Changes for Top enrollment and No 
enrollment 2004-2008  
 
 
 
Heckman Procedure    
To account for the potential selection bias, robustness checks using a Heckman selection 
method are introduced below. Heckman’s (1979) insight to abating the selectivity bias was 
originally designed for linear regression models. The aim of the current paper was to replace the 
categorical dependent variable (election outcomes) with a variable appropriate for the second stage 
of the Heckman procedure. Although a vote share variable would offer a feasible opportunity to 
extend the analysis to a linear regression model, vote shares reported for each candidate in 2008 
are fraught with inconsistency.  A closer review of the data shows that 1196 mayors received over 
100 percent (in some cases mayors received in excesses of up to 500 percent) of the valid vote 
share. To avoid including heterogeneity that would result from vote cancellations, I employ a 
Heckman selection model that uses two probit estimations where the second equation takes a 
broader measure of elections by looking at outcomes only, not votes captured by each candidate.  
No Enrollment Change         
   Top 5% Enrollment 
Performance    
Municipal 
Coverage  (%) probability Std. Err. 
        
Z 
                   
P>z  Probability Std. Err. Z P>z 
20 0.7035509 0.011826 59.49 0.00  0.6767301 0.015509 43.63 0.00 
40 0.6923949 0.008865 78.1 0.00  0.6842253 0.009937 68.86 0.00 
60 0.6810261 0.011316 60.18 0.00  0.6916319 0.011985 57.71 0.00 
80 0.6694543 0.017336 38.62 0.00  0.6989481 0.019028 36.73 0.00 
100 0.6576902 0.024645 26.69 0.00  0.7061712 0.027209 25.95 0.00 
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Although an OLS estimation would be ideal, the two stage probit has become increasingly popular 
in the social sciences for analyzing bivariate outcomes (Dubin and Rivers: 1994).  
The procedure is broken down into two equations: the first equation determines the 
probability of appearing as a candidate. It is estimated using a probit regression with maximum 
likelihood estimators. Results from the selection model are then incorporated in a second equation 
that estimates the probability of winning by “weighting” the equation with an estimation of the 
“omitted variable” using the inverse Mills ratio.5  
The key to this first equation (herein the selection equation) is the use of an instrumental 
variable that is important for estimating the probability of running in the selection equation and 
has no influence on election outcomes in the equation of interest. The difficulty of finding an 
instrumental variable between contiguous electoral cycles has long been recognized as a thorny 
challenge for electoral research (See Jacobson 1990). This paper leverages two unique aspects 
Brazil’s weakly institutionalized political party systems in order to use incumbent mayors’ 
political parties as instrumental variables in the equation that predict running, but not election 
outcomes.  
Scholars have long noted the discrete weaknesses of Brazil’s political party system. 
Mainwaring (1999) in particular argues that parties in Brazil have weak roots in society.  In this 
type of weak party system voting behaviors are highly personalistic and only a minority of the 
votes at all levels of government are in fact party based.  The low levels of party identification 
among the Brazilian electorate supports the argument that parties should have little to no influence 
on election outcomes. From this standpoint, political parties do not impact election outcomes.  In 
                                                 
5 For all mayors who faced the decision to run in 2008 compute  ?̂?𝑖 =
𝜙𝑖 
′ (𝜔𝑖 ?̂?)
Φ(𝑊𝑖𝛾)̂
  in the selection equation. The 
equation of interest is then estimated by OLS with Y as function of X and our ?̂? estimates for each mayor.   
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the context of Brazil’s weak party system, this aspect of political parties satisfies the first condition 
of the instrumental variable in the Heckman procedure.   
Although political parties may not influence electoral outcomes, a function of their weak 
institutionalization, it does not mean that parties are not used strategically by mayors. This second 
feature characteristic of Brazil’s weak party system is evidenced by a combination of theory and 
empirical research. In Brazil’s weak party system, politicians often switch party affiliations 
numerous times over their careers. For example, in his study of incumbency effects in Brazil’s 
mayoral elections, Magalhes shows that up to 30 percent of incumbent mayors switched parties in 
2008.  It could be argued, then, that party switching is a strategic decision thought to influence the 
probability of winning. In the same study on incumbency effects, Magalhes employs regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) to show that there is no effect on elections odds for party switching 
between incumbent near winners and near losers in 2008.  In other words, even if mayors think 
their strategic switch increased the chances of winning, it doesn’t. This analysis only looks at a 
very special group of mayors who barely won and barely lost elections (N=683) but it shows that 
switching is not statistically linked to the equation of interest. 
Beyond winning, there are several plausible reasons to explain party switching. For 
mayors, it is often the case that development projects or lucrative government contracts must be 
negotiated with strong state governors who oversee a large portion of expenditures for local 
governments.  Aligning with the state governor, elected in 2006, could be a decisive factor for 
politicians who decide to rerun in 2008. If their party aligns with the governor, they may not switch. 
Even in the case where mayors share the same party as the state governor, non-switching is a 
strategic choice.     
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The distinction between perceptions of party importance for winning compared to parties 
used as factors that influence a candidates’ decisions to run is an important one to recapitulate. 
Using prior theory of low levels of party system identification among the Brazilian electoral, we 
know that political parties should not predict mayoral election outcomes.  Because they do not 
influence outcomes in our equation of interest, political parties satisfy one requirement of the 
instrumental approach. Using theory about the strategic use of political parties vis-à-vis switching 
and the dependency of municipalities under powerful state governments, the paper argues that 
parties are in fact important for what predicts an incumbent’s probability of re-running in 2008.   
Although, it is easy to argue that switching patterns equate to strategies used for winning (thereby 
influencing our outcome equation) prior research shows that these strategic choices, despite 
intentions, are not rewarded electorally. The argument hinges on the statistical significance of 
political parties predicting decisions to run in the selection equation.  
 
The Heckman procedure is expressed below with the following two equations:  
 
Selection equation (Probit) 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑖
′ + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖
′ +  𝑢𝑖          (1.2) 
Equation of Interest (OLS) 
                                     𝑆 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑅𝑖
′ + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖
′ + ?̂? +  𝑢𝑖                        (1.3) 
 
Where P is the probability of running, Y= 1, for the ith mayor in 2008 in equation 1.2. The 
probability of running is expressed as function of a candidate’s political party𝑉𝑖,  𝑅𝑖
′ a matrix of 
covariates relating to performance for Bolsa Família  and 𝑋𝑖
′  a matrix of variables related to 
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municipal and mayoral characteristics. In the equation of interest 1.3, 𝑆 stands for the vote share 
of the ith mayor in 2008.  Just as in equation 1.1, equation 1.3 is expressed as a function of   𝑅𝑖
′, a 
matrix of covariates relating to performance for Bolsa Família, 𝑋𝑖
′  a matrix of variables related to 
municipal and mayoral characteristics previously discussed in the section above. The ?̂? estimate is 
the inverse mills ratio that accounts for early retirement. Political parties are excluded from 
equation 1.3.    
Unlike the extreme bounds approach discussed above, if specified correctly, the Heckman 
selection procedure has the added benefit of producing unbiased, and efficient, estimates for the 
policy variables.  By modeling the selection effect in a separate equation and then incorporating it 
into the equation of interest, the early retirees have been accounted for and the estimations are 
made on incumbents that ran.  The Heckman method can give a better gauge of the true policy 
effect that is produced in the first methodological approach to selection.  
The results from the Heckman procedure are compared against probit estimations on the 
two different data structures in Method 1 (i.e. upper and lower bounds) in Table 1.5 below. the 
odds of reelection and the variables of interest when confronting a potential selection bias.   
Each coefficient from Table 1.5 gives the change in the z-score for a unit change in the 
model covariates. Point estimates for explanatory policy variables in all three models show a stable 
and positive influence on election outcomes. With respect to the key explanatory variable, 
Program Size and Enrollment Change, assuming the Heckman procedure is correctly specified, 
after correcting for selection by way of the political party exclusion restriction, the influence of 
this variable drops from .07 and .08 in the lower and upper boundary probit estimations (Models 
1 and 2), to .06 in the Heckman estimation (Model 3). The variable also remains significant in the 
selection corrected model. The comparison across the three models supports the argument that 
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good governance with respect to enrollment efforts in Bolsa Família  is a marginal determinant for 
reelection, even after considering selection issues.   
 
Table 1.5: Heckman Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Notes: *p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001; + p ≤ .10 
 
 
 
 
The results from this procedure, however, are not free from complications that challenge 
key assumptions of this two-step procedure.  In the sections above, I provided a theoretical 
foundation for using political parties to instrument for any potential selection bias. Results from 
Dependent Variable     
(Election Outcomes) Probits   
Heckman 
Selection   
                      [Models] 
Data 
Structure 1 
Data 
Structure 2 
Probit 
(Election 
Outcomes) 
Probit 
(selection) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Bolsa Família  Policy 
Variables     
Repercussions     
 .166** .151 * .092  -.181** 
  .259 *** .258 *** .159* -.049  
     
 .323 ***  .371*** .272** 
.043 
 
Program Size -.113 -.149  
 
-.135  
 .042  
Enrollment Change  -.030 ** -.0351* -.026 + -.008  
Program 
Size*Enrollment 
Change .074 ** .087 * .067 * .018  
 
Political Party [4 only] 
 
                                  
 
N= 3755 N= 2686 N= 3755 N= 3750 
 
Wald Chi2 
=332.95 
Wald Chi2 
=172 
Wald Chi2 
=101.16 
Wald Chi2 
=415.22 
 
p > Chi2 
=0.000 
p > Chi2 
=0.000 
p > Chi2 
=0.000 
p > Chi2 
=0.000 
 
Pseud R2= 
.08 
Pseud R2= 
.059 
 rho =-
.7801828 
Pseud R2= 
.097 
    
p > Chi2 
=0.023  
47 
 
 47 
Table 1.6 on the next page, provide empirical evidence that the use of political parties come very 
close to satisfying both requirements of the instrumental approach to a selection bias.   
Table 1.6 provides the joint hypothesis tests for political party inclusion for each probit and 
logit estimation for the probability of rerunning as well as election outcomes for 2008. For both 
logit and probit models for the selection equation (1 and 2), although not all parties reach statistical 
significance, considering parties with respect to the model’s explanatory power, this variable has 
significant effects for the model when joint hypothesis testing is introduced. Moving to outcomes 
in models 3 and 4 in the equation of interests, it is clear that political parties offer less explanatory 
power. For logit model 3, the joint hypothesis test reveals that political party inclusion is just over 
the conventional .05 level of significance. The joint hypothesis tests for political parties in the 
probit estimation in model 4 still reaches significance (indicating parties predict outcomes to some 
extent) but the test statistic is larger than the first probit estimation on a candidate’s decision to run 
(indicating less significance compared to the selection equation) 
 
Taking stock of the results from Table 1.6, it is safe to conclude that political parties are 
weak instruments to address the selection effect. Notwithstanding these empirical shortcomings, 
the output from Table 1.5 show that any bias coming from weak instruments does not have much 
of an influence on the standard errors for key policy variables. Not only are the standard errors 
consistent,   note  that the coefficient from Model 3 (.06) falls strikingly close to the values of the 
estimates from Models 1 (.07) and 2 (.08) that introduce strict assumptions and bias, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Joint Hypothesis Tests for Political Party Instruments 2004-2008 
 
            Notes: *p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001; + p ≤ .10  
 
        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
When the two step procedure is estimated without a political party exclusion restriction in Model 
4, the results for the explanatory variable of interest are identical to all other models (.07) and have 
similar standard errors. If selection is present, indicated by the rho in Table 1.5, then the bias on 
the policy coefficients is very small. For other variables in the model, selection is potentially acting 
stronger.  
Rerun Logit [1] Probit[2]  Outcome 2008 Logit [3]   Probit[4]  
11(PP) 0.882 -0.068  0.906 -0.062 
12(PDT) 1.654** 0.269***  1.457 0.227 
13(PT) 1.185 0.099  1.018** 0.015 
14(PTB) 0.991 -0.003  0.872 -0.088 
15(PMDB) 6.235+ 0.993**  3.853 0.8 
17(PSL) 0.402 -0.522  0.341*** -0.668 
19(PTN) 0.291 -0.751**  0.759 -0.184 
20(PSC) 0.901 -0.07  0.879 -0.078 
22(PR) 0.936 -0.054  0.855 -0.095 
23(PPS) 0.882 -0.076  0.815 -0.13 
25(DEM) 1 0  1 0 
27(PSDC) 1.1 0.079  1.76 0.342 
28(PRTB) 1.464 0.27  2.159 0.487 
31(PHS) 1.218 0.129  1.597 0.283 
33(PMN) 3.507+ 0.764**  2.06 0.431 
36(PTC) 1.273 0.149  0.895 -0.076 
40(PSB) 0.898 -0.069  1.11 0.059 
43(PV) 1.532 0.264  1.257 0.142 
44(PRP) 1.547 0.291  1.577 0.276 
45(PSDB) 0.766+ -0.162+  0.889 -0.072 
65(PCdoB) 0.428 -0.506  2.785 0.671 
70(PTdoB) 1.273 0.133  0.903   
Wald Chi2        
Prob>Chi2 .000  .000  .000  .000 
Hypothesis Test        
Prob>Chi2 0.0182  0.0084  0.0596  0.0397 
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